The Nature of Evil pt. 7
Recently, the Drivler has tried his hand at my "Evil" thought experiment. That is, when asked what set of circumstances would define evil within this rather closed system, he attempted to come up with more circumstances. That's fine. Think of as many circumstances as you'd like. Posit conditions A through Z, as long as they exist within or in relation to this system, you've not answered the question, only complicated it--but this system which I have described bears complication. If you want to include janitorial motives and room designer motives, they too will work in here.
Let's try this another way. The experiment is designed with a specific variable to be deciphered. If we agree that there is the potential for an evil act within this room with its red button, then we must also agree that there is the potential for an innocent act. Notice, I am positioning innocence, and not virtue, against evil. By doing so, the experiment becomes binary--either the act under description is evil or it isn't. What decides the evil of this act is always the conditions present around the button pressing, and more importantly, not what the person pressing the button knows, but rather what they should know. When should they know that pressing the button is not a very good thing to do, and not because of what pressing the button WILL do, but what it MIGHT do. Also notice their is no capitulation in this experiment. If the button presser kills off a million people, there is no suggestion that anyone, not even the button presser, will know who to blame.
What's up for grabs in this experiment is not actually an answer as to the nature of evil. Instead, the experiment defines what you, the experimenter, are willing to call evil and what you are willing to call innocent. But in that it asks you to make such a decision, the experiment allows you to examine the process to go through in order to come to your decision. You cannot say that there is no evil act possible. I need only posit a set of circumstances which indicate that pressing the button will immediately kill the janitor and that the presser of the button knows all of these circumstances and the only factor as to what the button presser doesn't know is whether or not the machine would work--and of course, the only reason to kill the janitor is because it is possible.
No matter where you draw the line in this experiment, no matter what trappings you place around the button, or context you place around the button pusher, the room designer or the janitor, at some point the act of pushing the button ceases to be innocent, accidental, or playful curiosity, and instead moves into a position of irresponsibility. In short, the button presser should have known better than to press the button, and as a result of this carelessness, people may have died.
What becomes evident at that point is that the entire nature of evil in this experiment is based on what the button presser aught to be able to figure out from the contexts surrounding the button. Moreover, if our button presser presses the button despite all possible signs, contexts, and symbols of caution, we can only come to three possible conclusions as to the nature of the act. Either the button presser is negligent (he/she doesn't bother to use what he knows to analyze the context), the button presser is ignorant (he/she lacks the ability to analyze the context), or the button presser is malicious (he/she knows the context and presses the button anyway).
Because El Drivler is reading this blog, I think it necessary to analyze a special case which seems to diverge from the three positions I have suggested: the button presser may be skeptical (he/she can analyze the contexts but simply does not believe them to accurately describe the nature of pressing the button). This special case does not hold up and in fact falls into one of the three positions I have already posited. Either the skeptical button presser is ignorant (they are unable to read the context clearly and this is the source of their doubt), or they are malicious (in which case they aren't sure whether the button will or won't kill millions of people, but they are willing to take that chance just to end their skeptical position).
Lastly, I have argued before that maliciousness is not a very good definition of evil, and yet this experiment seems to double back on that previous assertion. It does not. The nature of the experiment is such that any number of contexts may be applied. One may find the act evil before assuming it to be malicious, and therefore, maliciousness is nothing but window dressing for evil. It reinforces our idea that the act is evil, but it is not a necessary component.
Let's try this another way. The experiment is designed with a specific variable to be deciphered. If we agree that there is the potential for an evil act within this room with its red button, then we must also agree that there is the potential for an innocent act. Notice, I am positioning innocence, and not virtue, against evil. By doing so, the experiment becomes binary--either the act under description is evil or it isn't. What decides the evil of this act is always the conditions present around the button pressing, and more importantly, not what the person pressing the button knows, but rather what they should know. When should they know that pressing the button is not a very good thing to do, and not because of what pressing the button WILL do, but what it MIGHT do. Also notice their is no capitulation in this experiment. If the button presser kills off a million people, there is no suggestion that anyone, not even the button presser, will know who to blame.
What's up for grabs in this experiment is not actually an answer as to the nature of evil. Instead, the experiment defines what you, the experimenter, are willing to call evil and what you are willing to call innocent. But in that it asks you to make such a decision, the experiment allows you to examine the process to go through in order to come to your decision. You cannot say that there is no evil act possible. I need only posit a set of circumstances which indicate that pressing the button will immediately kill the janitor and that the presser of the button knows all of these circumstances and the only factor as to what the button presser doesn't know is whether or not the machine would work--and of course, the only reason to kill the janitor is because it is possible.
No matter where you draw the line in this experiment, no matter what trappings you place around the button, or context you place around the button pusher, the room designer or the janitor, at some point the act of pushing the button ceases to be innocent, accidental, or playful curiosity, and instead moves into a position of irresponsibility. In short, the button presser should have known better than to press the button, and as a result of this carelessness, people may have died.
What becomes evident at that point is that the entire nature of evil in this experiment is based on what the button presser aught to be able to figure out from the contexts surrounding the button. Moreover, if our button presser presses the button despite all possible signs, contexts, and symbols of caution, we can only come to three possible conclusions as to the nature of the act. Either the button presser is negligent (he/she doesn't bother to use what he knows to analyze the context), the button presser is ignorant (he/she lacks the ability to analyze the context), or the button presser is malicious (he/she knows the context and presses the button anyway).
Because El Drivler is reading this blog, I think it necessary to analyze a special case which seems to diverge from the three positions I have suggested: the button presser may be skeptical (he/she can analyze the contexts but simply does not believe them to accurately describe the nature of pressing the button). This special case does not hold up and in fact falls into one of the three positions I have already posited. Either the skeptical button presser is ignorant (they are unable to read the context clearly and this is the source of their doubt), or they are malicious (in which case they aren't sure whether the button will or won't kill millions of people, but they are willing to take that chance just to end their skeptical position).
Lastly, I have argued before that maliciousness is not a very good definition of evil, and yet this experiment seems to double back on that previous assertion. It does not. The nature of the experiment is such that any number of contexts may be applied. One may find the act evil before assuming it to be malicious, and therefore, maliciousness is nothing but window dressing for evil. It reinforces our idea that the act is evil, but it is not a necessary component.
posted by Monstro D. Whale at
9:02 AM
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